The postwar Soviet Empire came to an end in 1989, leaving the United States as the world’s one great superpower. President George Bush, Sr. announced a “new world order… a new era, free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.” Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, putting this new world order to the test. The United States led United Nations forces to repel the invasion. War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications by Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb explores the Gulf War in four parts: Origins of the Gulf War, Immediate Causes of the Gulf War, Stages of the Gulf War, and Responsibilities for the Gulf War. The authors ultimately conclude that the war was not inevitable. The conflict could have been resolved peacefully.
The first part of the book, Origins of the Gulf War, looks at what Muslim scholars call “sabab,” the original, deeper causes of the issue. These are the differences that arose before Iraq and Kuwait became independent states.[1] Khadduri and Ghareeb recount Iraq’s differences with Kuwait as they developed and became increasingly complex since they were separated from the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Questions of frontiers, as well as disputes over territorial sovereignty, security and oil prices date back to when they were both under British control. Khadduri and Ghareeb identify Iraq’s claims to Kuwait in three categories: historical, legal, and strategic.[2]
Part two of the book looks at the “illa,” or immediate causes of the war. These include the impact of the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) on Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a surprise to most observers in the West, because Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had provided financial and political support to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war.[3] Following the Iraq-Iran War, Iraq was burdened with heavy foreign debt and had lingering concerns about Iranian threats to its Gulf access. Iraq’s Gulf coast is a mere forty miles long, and Kuwait provided no assistance to them in obtaining a maritime port. [4] Saddam Husayn’s reputation as a leader had been bolstered by winning the war with Iran, but he had concerns about domestic groups calling for reforms. In an effort to be acknowledged as a national leader, he took steps to have popular elections in Iraq to determine the presidency. Khadduri and Ghareeb suggest that Husayn may have thought that the annexation of Kuwait would help him win such an election.[5]
Kuwait had increased its oil production during the Iraq-Iran War, because the oil production of the warring countries had suddenly dropped. When Iraq resumed oil production after the war, Kuwait and other Arab Gulf countries refused to decrease their oil production. This kept the price of oil low, much to the dismay of Iraq who needed revenue for their reconstruction efforts. The Arab Summit on May 28, 1990 did not bring resolution to the issue. Evidence emerged that Britain and the United States both encouraged Kuwait to refuse to submit to Iraqi demands.[6]
Khadduri and Ghareeb propose three underlying factors that led to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. First was that the Iraq-Iran War produced insecurity and suspicion among the Gulf countries. Second was Israel’s concern about Iraq’s rearmament program, which included efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. This influenced the United States to take measures to keep Iraq from becoming a threat to its neighbors. Third was the fact that the Western world viewed Iraq with suspicion and disfavor because it had entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union.[7] Khadduri and Ghareeb detail accusations and counter-accusations made between Iraq and Kuwait, along with diplomatic efforts made to settle the disagreements peaceably.
Part three of the book looks at the war itself, including the invasion of Kuwait, the role of the United Nations, the coalition war, Iraq under the aegis of the United Nations, Shi’i and Kurdish uprisings, and finally demarcation of the frontiers.[8]
The last part of the book examines the standard of responsibility for war as it has varied from age to age and from nation to nation. Khadduri and Ghareeb identify three grounds on which the United States’ rationale for intervening in the Gulf rested. First was the U.S.’s protection of their own national interests in that Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait would enable him to set oil prices. Second was the U.S.’s commitment to preserve the security of other countries in the region. Third was the rationalization that Western intervention was a form of just war against the jihad that Iraq had declared against Western intervention in Islamic lands.[9]
Finally, Khadduri and Ghareeb tackle the question of whether or not the Gulf War was inevitable. They describe two theories as to the aims and drives of the leaders involved in the crisis: destiny and conspiracy. According to Islamic traditions, all human actions as well as the destiny of mankind have been predetermined by God. The authors quote several Iraqi leaders who support the notion that they would fight if it was “predetermined” that they do – if it was their “destiny.” The conspiracy theory asserts that George Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher believed that Husayn’s goal was to control the whole Gulf region. They both also supposedly held personal grudges against Husayn.[10]
Khadduri and Ghareeb allow for an element of truth to both the ideas of destiny and conspiracy, but note that the theories don’t address the possibility of achieving peace with justice. They identify two opportunities for the parties to have resolved the crisis without war. The first was at a meeting in Jidda under the Saudi government on July 31, 1990. The authors note that the three Arab leaders who proposed the Jidda meetings missed an opportunity for peaceful settlement by not offering adequate mediation.[11] The second opportunity for peace came when two Arab leaders, King Husayn and President Husni Mubarak, telephoned President Bush requesting that he allow them time to resolve the crisis through negotiation. Bush declined to give the leaders adequate time to carry out their plan.[12] The authors’ final conclusion was that the Gulf War was not inevitable and that the blame may be shared among Western and Arab leaders. Had the Arab leaders acted more quickly, or the Western leaders been more patient, the crisis may have been resolved peacefully.[13]
[1] Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications (Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.
[2] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 4.
[3] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 77.
[4] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 78.
[5] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 80.
[6] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 84.
[7] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 94.
[8] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 118.
[9] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 252.
[10] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 254.
[11] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 256.
[12] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 257.
[13] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 257.
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