War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications (Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb)

        The postwar Soviet Empire came to an end in 1989, leaving the United States as the world’s one great superpower. President George Bush, Sr. announced a “new world order… a new era, free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.” Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, putting this new world order to the test. The United States led United Nations forces to repel the invasion. War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications by Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb explores the Gulf War in four parts: Origins of the Gulf War, Immediate Causes of the Gulf War, Stages of the Gulf War, and Responsibilities for the Gulf War. The authors ultimately conclude that the war was not inevitable. The conflict could have been resolved peacefully.

        The first part of the book, Origins of the Gulf War, looks at what Muslim scholars call “sabab,” the original, deeper causes of the issue. These are the differences that arose before Iraq and Kuwait became independent states.[1] Khadduri and Ghareeb recount Iraq’s differences with Kuwait as they developed and became increasingly complex since they were separated from the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Questions of frontiers, as well as disputes over territorial sovereignty, security and oil prices date back to when they were both under British control. Khadduri and Ghareeb identify Iraq’s claims to Kuwait in three categories: historical, legal, and strategic.[2]

Part two of the book looks at the “illa,” or immediate causes of the war. These include the impact of the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) on Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a surprise to most observers in the West, because Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had provided financial and political support to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war.[3] Following the Iraq-Iran War, Iraq was burdened with heavy foreign debt and had lingering concerns about Iranian threats to its Gulf access. Iraq’s Gulf coast is a mere forty miles long, and Kuwait provided no assistance to them in obtaining a maritime port. [4] Saddam Husayn’s reputation as a leader had been bolstered by winning the war with Iran, but he had concerns about domestic groups calling for reforms. In an effort to be acknowledged as a national leader, he took steps to have popular elections in Iraq to determine the presidency. Khadduri and Ghareeb suggest that Husayn may have thought that the annexation of Kuwait would help him win such an election.[5]

Kuwait had increased its oil production during the Iraq-Iran War, because the oil production of the warring countries had suddenly dropped. When Iraq resumed oil production after the war, Kuwait and other Arab Gulf countries refused to decrease their oil production. This kept the price of oil low, much to the dismay of Iraq who needed revenue for their reconstruction efforts. The Arab Summit on May 28, 1990 did not bring resolution to the issue. Evidence emerged that Britain and the United States both encouraged Kuwait to refuse to submit to Iraqi demands.[6]

Khadduri and Ghareeb propose three underlying factors that led to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. First was that the Iraq-Iran War produced insecurity and suspicion among the Gulf countries. Second was Israel’s concern about Iraq’s rearmament program, which included efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. This influenced the United States to take measures to keep Iraq from becoming a threat to its neighbors. Third was the fact that the Western world viewed Iraq with suspicion and disfavor because it had entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union.[7] Khadduri and Ghareeb detail accusations and counter-accusations made between Iraq and Kuwait, along with diplomatic efforts made to settle the disagreements peaceably.

Part three of the book looks at the war itself, including the invasion of Kuwait, the role of the United Nations, the coalition war, Iraq under the aegis of the United Nations, Shi’i and Kurdish uprisings, and finally demarcation of the frontiers.[8]

The last part of the book examines the standard of responsibility for war as it has varied from age to age and from nation to nation. Khadduri and Ghareeb identify three grounds on which the United States’ rationale for intervening in the Gulf rested. First was the U.S.’s protection of their own national interests in that Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait would enable him to set oil prices. Second was the U.S.’s commitment to preserve the security of other countries in the region. Third was the rationalization that Western intervention was a form of just war against the jihad that Iraq had declared against Western intervention in Islamic lands.[9]

Finally, Khadduri and Ghareeb tackle the question of whether or not the Gulf War was inevitable. They describe two theories as to the aims and drives of the leaders involved in the crisis: destiny and conspiracy. According to Islamic traditions, all human actions as well as the destiny of mankind have been predetermined by God. The authors quote several Iraqi leaders who support the notion that they would fight if it was “predetermined” that they do – if it was their “destiny.” The conspiracy theory asserts that George Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher believed that Husayn’s goal was to control the whole Gulf region. They both also supposedly held personal grudges against Husayn.[10]

Khadduri and Ghareeb allow for an element of truth to both the ideas of destiny and conspiracy, but note that the theories don’t address the possibility of achieving peace with justice. They identify two opportunities for the parties to have resolved the crisis without war. The first was at a meeting in Jidda under the Saudi government on July 31, 1990. The authors note that the three Arab leaders who proposed the Jidda meetings missed an opportunity for peaceful settlement by not offering adequate mediation.[11] The second opportunity for peace came when two Arab leaders, King Husayn and President Husni Mubarak, telephoned President Bush requesting that he allow them time to resolve the crisis through negotiation. Bush declined to give the leaders adequate time to carry out their plan.[12] The authors’ final conclusion was that the Gulf War was not inevitable and that the blame may be shared among Western and Arab leaders. Had the Arab leaders acted more quickly, or the Western leaders been more patient, the crisis may have been resolved peacefully.[13]

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[1] Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications (Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.

[2] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 4.

[3] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 77.

[4] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 78.

[5] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 80.

[6] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 84.

[7] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 94.

[8] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 118.

[9] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 252.

[10] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 254.

[11] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 256.

[12] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 257.

[13] Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 257.

The University at War

Hugh Gusterson wrote an essay titled The University at War which highlights the "demodernization" of the Iraq education system.  The 25 page essay gives evidence from a variety of sources including today's top war corespondents, specifically Thomas Ricks, he writes explaining the connection between the desert storm conflict in 1991 and the Gulf War in 2003.  Gusterson will include in his essay statistics showing the decline in the Iraq education system and the systematic decline of education in the country as a direct result of Desert Storm.  As far as education in Iraq before the 1991 conflict was considered one of the best in the Middle East and today is considered the weakest says Gusterson using documentation from United Nations conferences as one of his many sources.  Siting that literacy rates were at 52% in 1977 and by 1987 the literacy rate had risen to 80% under the Saddam Hussein regime at the same time university attendance more than doubled and the university education in Iraq was free, paid for by the government.  Iraqi's considered themselves to be living in the "Cradle of civilization" based on the ancient society and contributions to all aspects of education.

Gusterson argued that after the conflict in 1991 a program called oil-for-food program left the children and young adults who wanted to go to school deprived of the material needed for a productive education.  The schools were ransacked for any material including wires and blackboards.
The UN sanctions against Iraq made it impossible for supplies to be shipped and any educational material was illegal to ship in according to the Christian Science Monitor.  Teaching was becoming an impossible task with no supplies and the decline of teaching salaries.  The Christian Science Monitor reported that salaries went from $2000 dollars before the conflict in the 1980's to less than $50 in the 1990's.  As a result professors fled and went to other countries According to Iraq's Association of University Teachers more than 10,000 instructors left Iraq.  Some to make a better living and then most because of government party affiliation. 

Was it possible to rebuild the University or the education system as a whole, the answer would have been yes if a few of the U.S. troops who guarded the oil ministries had been left in the cities to over see the protection of schools or universities.  However, that did not happen and because it did not happen looters picked the buildings clean of all books and artifacts selling them on the black market.  Those books and documents that had not been stolen, instead the building were burned destroying, according to Fernando Baez author of A Universal History of the Destruction of Books up to one million books and ten million unique documents were burned in various educational buildings. 

The essay shows example after example from page 11-14 of ways in which Iraqi education was put aside, first John Agresto is appointed as Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Education his goal, to create a modern university system with the latest electronic technology and establish a comparative religion program where the bible could be taught and studied.  He requested $1.2 billion for the rebuilding of the educational system but was only given $8 million and $500,000 was for administration overhead.  By the end of 2004 no money was given to rebuild the education system in Iraq.

By 2004  the university system is in shambles and party affiliation is of utmost importance.  The universities have become chaotic, Professor curriculum were being sabotaged by the two different parties and professors are being threatened to follow along party lines or they would be killed.  Many professors as per Gusterson were being assassinated whether they complied or not, violence at the universities were happening more frequently.  In 2006 the Washington Post estimated 160 professors had been killed. In the 1980's women were attending university and by 2004 less than 10% of the students were women because of Muslim Fundamentalist, not allowing women to get a higher education at the universities.

Gusterson pointed to a shift in university policy and funding from 2006-2009, The Department of Homeland Security received $1billion of research money to be used at a number of different universities for new support centers of excellence.  Anti-Terrorism centers popped up at the countries most prestige including University of Southern California and Purdue University and Rutgers University.  Gusterson argues that the war has taken its toll on the Iraqi people specifically the young students who at one time had one of the best and because of military"destruction" getting the Iraq education system to stand out will take many years of rebuilding if at all possible.





 The children could not even

The Absence of Grand Strategy

The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005

By Steve Yetiv

“Overarching goal of the book is to look at how great powers behaved in distant lands.” (ix) The two general goals of the book are balance of power and the evolution of U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf between 1972 and 2005. The key question explored is “To what extent did balance-of-power animate the thinking behind, and practice of, American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region, as compared to other approaches?” (x)

The United States did not have a grand strategy rather they were slowly dragged into the region by their reaction to a series of events which caused an alteration to American policies. Grand strategy is defined as a set of approaches used by a major state to advance their interest and policies to achieve a national goal. The U.S. did not pursue a grand strategy because they had vital interest in the Persian Gulf which needed military protection which included preventing a single nation state from dominating the region and controlling the world’s oil reserves. (7)

Rather than serving as a balance of power in the Middle East the United States bolstered the strongest actor to create a greater imbalance of power. The United States was more likely to balance against prevailing threats than prevailing power in the region. The end of the Cold War, the rise of American global power caused a shift away from balancing. (6)

Foreign policy in the region has a direct impact on economic fortunes of all countries linked by global interdependence. (19)

America’s Gulf policy

1972-1979 Nixon’s twin pillar policy

            The U.S. promised the Shah of Iran access to U.S. weapons in exchange for protecting U.S. regional security interest (free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz). (37)  Iran would balance Iraq at the regional level (which it failed to do) and Moscow at the global level, who were strengthening ties with Egypt. The treaty helped solidify the alignment of Moscow and Iraq. (32)

1982-1985 Regan’s tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War

            Removed Iraq from the list of state sponsored terrorism, sent American arms to Iraq through Kuwait and Jordan. In response to the Iran hostage crisis the U.S. provided intelligence to Iraq to strengthen its position at Basra. (51)

1985-1986 Iran-Contra Affair

            Obtain the release of hostages in Lebanon captured between 1984 and 1985, and help Contras in Nicaragua with funds from arms sales to Iran to overthrow the communist leaning government. (54)

1986-1987 U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers

            Refflaging dispelled the belief that the United States did not want to end the war, weakened Iran’s naval advantage over Iraq, and undermined Iran’s ability to retaliate against Kuwait for their support of Iraq in the war. (62)

1988-1990 Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait

            Iraq invaded Kuwait which they argued was part of their territory. (77) Kuwait ignored oil producing quotas and kept prices low. Kuwait refused to forgive Iraq its war debt form the Iran-Iraq War and did not provide reconstruction credit to Iran. (78) The U.S. was forced to respond to the invasion of Kuwait which altered the existing policy of constructive engagement and changed American foreign policy in the region. (75)

Decline in the balance of power can be attributed to the fact that the end of the Cold War made it easier for the United States to adopt non-balancing strategies that would have been viewed as a threat to the Soviet Union. America’s rise on the global stage also made it easier to adopt more aggressive tactics toward the region. (147)

The United States had a reactive strategy to the events in the region. American foreign policy in the region was inconsistent, which was partly due to the fact that the United States has many goals in many different areas. (193) "Great powers start with grand ideas but end up with a high dose of reality." Decision makers are forced to react without much preparation to changing situations. (197)

*The book also discusses U.S. foreign policy during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

Persian Gulf War

Sources:

Freedman, Lawrence. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World. Maryland: Princeton, 2004.

Khaduri, Majid. War in the Gulf, 1990-1991. Oxford Press, 2001

Yetiv, Steve A. U.S. Decision-Making ans the Persian Gulf War. Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2004.

Yetiv, Steve A. The Absence of a Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf War. Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2008.

Standards:

SS.912.A.7.11- Analyze the foreign policy of the United States as it relates to the Middle East. 

SS.912.A.7.12- Analyze political, economic, and social concerns that emerged at the end of the 20th century and into the 21st century.